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Context Matters-What Lawyers Say About Choice of Law
Decisions in Merger Agreements
Juliet P. Kostritsky*

study of choice of law provisions in merger agreements yields varitheories as to how much thought parties put into them, and what
tors influence such decisions. Eisenberg and Miller found a shift to
ew York law and other scholars later hypothesized that parties specify
New York law rather than Delaware law because New York law is
re formalistic. However, a study of 343 merger agreements, consisting of 15 lawyer interviews and a survey sent to 812 lawyers across the
rcountry, suggests differently. First, there is no shift from Delaware to
New York. Second, a desire for formalistic law is not the motivating
tor for lawyers. Choice of law provisions in merger agreements are
tivated by a multitude of contextual factors. Further, the clients' intent for choice of law is often unclear due to the way such provisions
e drafted in the context of a principal agent relationship.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Finding out the truth about a matter can proceed in many different
ways. Neoclassical law and economists would construct models built
on certain assumptions. 1 The empiricists and contextualists would collect data about the matter in the inductive not deductive sense. 2
1. The unreality of those assumptions has led Judge Posner himself to admit that its "basic
propositions are really not empirical propositions at all. They are all generated by 'reflection' on
an 'assumption' about choice under scarcity and rational maximization." Victoria Nourse &
Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can A New World Prompt A New Legal The·
ory, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 68 (2009).
2. Of course, even the accumulation of evidence is subject to the "shocking discovery that
induction is fallible " though of course, "it mostly works." JAMES FRANKLlN, WHAT ScrENCE
KNows AND How IT KNows IT 11 (2009). Empiricists build a model of reality using large data
sets and regression analysis. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002)
(limiting definition of empirical scholarship to studies using statistical methods). For contextualists such as Professor Stewart Macaulay, " [s]tatistical studies are not enough .... They enter the
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This Article follows the path of empiricists and contextualists by
studying, in detail, the choices lawyers make in regard to choice of law
provisions in merger deals.
A close study of these provisions in merger agreements is important
for several reasons. It illuminates how parties make choices in drafting these contracts, shedding light on lawyering in a discrete transactional setting. Studying the process of choice of law in merger
agreements highlights the difficulties courts face when they try to interpret the meaning behind any provision in a contract negotiated between commercial firms with assistance from counsel. Agency issues
loom large in such settings. 3 If a provision is included by a lawyer and
the lawyer, not the client, makes the choice of law decision, what implications does that have for a court trying to ascertain the party's (in
the sense of the commercial firm's) intent on the choice of law issue?
Is there such a thing as a party's intent when the commercial firm (the
client) played little role in choosing the provision? Is the existence of
a party's intent even possible if the party is not a sole proprietor? Will
a study of choice of law provisions shed light on the role of lawyers
more generally in transactional practice? Finally, are there implications for other issues not directly governed by the choice of law provisions? By studying the meaning of choice of law in merger
agreements, we may resolve other issues involving party choice such
as: What interpretive approach to take to a contract when the goal
begins with ascertaining the party's intent? and Whose intent matters
and why?
Choice of law provisions continue to generate great scholarly interest. Early on, scholars collected choice of law data to study whether
there was a shift in the preferred choice of law in merger agreements. 4
institutions of the world and observe, systematically interview and survey individuals within
them." Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 79, 81.
For a valuable discussion of the differences between inductively and deductively arrived at inferences, see CHARLES MCCANN, JR., PROBABILITY FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC THEORY 4-6
(1994). McCann notes Hume's insight that " [a] reliance on empirical generalizations as a basis
for the establishment of immutable laws of behavior is thus doomed to failure, since no causal
relationship is determinable." Id. at 6. This Article does not seek to establish general laws valid
across all circumstances but to capture a reality of lawyer's choices in a certain context.
3. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Du KE L.J. 389, 394 (2003)
(the "principal-agent problem involves the difficulty that one actor (the principal) will have in
getting another actor (the agent) to work on the first party's behalf. A principal can reduce
measurement costs to the extent that it can use financial or other incentives to align the selfinterest of the agent with its own interests.")
4. Eisenberg and Miller emphasize that Delaware is still the preferred choice but that "to the
degree that there is a flight from Delaware in this respect, the beneficiaries are New York and
California." Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 V AND. L. REV. 1975, 1982 (2006).
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the lawyer, not the client, makes the choice of law decision, what implications does that have for a court trying to ascertain the party's (in
the sense of the commercial firm's) intent on the choice of law issue?
Is there such a thing as a party's intent when the commercial firm (the
client) played little role in choosing the provision? Is the existence of
a party's intent even possible if the party is not a sole proprietor? Will
a study of choice of law provisions shed light on the role of lawyers
more generally in transactional practice? Finally, are there implications for other issues not directly governed by the choice of law provisions? By studying the meaning of choice of law in merger
agreements, we may resolve other issues involving party choice such
as: What interpretive approach to take to a contract when the goal
begins with ascertaining the party's intent? and Whose intent matters
and why?
Choice of law provisions continue to generate great scholarly interest. Early on, scholars collected choice of law data to study whether
there was a shift in the preferred choice of law in merger agreements. 4
institutions of the world and observe, systematically interview and survey individuals within
them." Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 79, 81.
For a valuable discussion of the differences between inductively and deductively arrived at inferences, see CHARLES McCANN, JR., PROBABILITY FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC THEORY 4-6
(1994). McCann notes Hume's insight that "[a] reliance on empirical generalizations as a basis
for the establishment of immutable laws of behavior is thus doomed to failure, since no causal
relationship is determinable." Id. at 6. This A r ticle does not seek to establish general laws valid
across all circumstances but to capture a reality of lawyer's choices in a certain context.
3. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 394 (2003)
(the "principal-agent problem involves the difficulty that one actor (the principal) will have in
getting another actor (the agent) to work on the first party's behalf. A principal can reduce
measurement costs to the extent that it can use financial or other incentives to align the selfinterest of the agent with its own interests.")
4. Eisenberg and Miller emphasize that Delaware is still the preferred choice but that "to the
degree that there is a flight from Delaware in this respect, the beneficiaries are New York and
California." Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P . Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 V AND. L. REv. 1975, 1982 (2006).
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To test the hypothesis that companies were fleeing to New York for
their choice of law, Professors Eisenberg and Miller studied a group of
merger agreements from a seven-month period in 2002 and found that
there was a flight from Delaware to New York 5 for the parties' choice
of law6 in merger agreements. 7
Other scholars relied on a later Eisenberg and Miller study, 8 which
used a broader array of contracts documenting a flight to New York
choice of law, to study the role of the transactional lawyer in drafting.
They hypothesized that companies specify New York because of its
5. The argument for a flight is built on data consisting of a study of merger agreements that
suggest a "flow away from Delaware and Other and towards New York and California." Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 1989. The data showed 181 incorporations in Delaware but only
135 choice of Delaware Jaw. Id. New York however, had only six incorporations but sixty-three
choices of New York law. Id. Here the argument is not that a greater number of parties are
choosing New York than they were in the past but ,that if a company is incorporated in New
York, it is more likely to choose that state's Jaw to govern than a company is to choose Delaware's Jaw to govern if it is incorporated in that New York.
6. Parties can decide with each agreement what Jaw should govern. See Larry E: Ribstein,
Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CoRP. L. 245, 247-48 (1993). Parties often place a provision in
their merger contract specifying the Jaw that they want to govern the agreement. Id. Courts
approach this issue by making a distinction between matters that are corporate in nature and
those that are peripheral. See id. at 268. For corporate matters, the court will normally apply the
Jaw of the state of incorporation, even if the merger agreement has chosen another Jaw to govern. See id. at 267. This is known as the internal affairs doctrine and is generally the approach
taken by courts with the exception of California. See id. at 266; JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF
A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 416
n.47 (1975). As to peripheral, non-corporate matters, courts normally enforce such provisions
unless they violate a constitutional provision of state Jaw. See Ribstein, supra note 6, at 294.
California has a provision making it unconstitutional to enforce a non-compete clause as to a
California employee even if the law of another state has been chosen to govern the agreement.
See FREUND, supra note 6, 416 n.47.
7. I have updated the Miller and Eisenberg study with a later data set for a later period of
time, January 1, 2011 through June 30, 2011. See KYLE CHEN, HAROLD HALLER, JULIET P.
KosTRJTSKY & WmsoR A. WoYCZYNSKI., FINDING A TREND TOWARD DELAWARE As THE
CHOICE OF LAW IN MERGER AGREEMENTS (on file with authors). My study is based on a data
set from the SEC EDGAR Database and covers acquisitions of public and private targets. It
directly tests the Miller and Eisenberg thesis to see if it still holds up at a later point in time. It .
finds that most merger agreements choose Delaware and the next most popular choice is New
York. The absence of data demonstrating a flight to New York in my statistical study does not
make the task of understanding why a law is chosen any easier. It simply makes it harder to
argue, at least if one accepts a characterization of New York Jaw as formal, that parties are
fleeing to New York. The survey reveals that 95% of respondents indicated that there is no shift
from Delaware to New York. A 2012 study followed up on the question of whether there was a
net outflow away from Delaware but this study did so in the context of public acquisitions. See
Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware's Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 92 (2012). I began my research a couple of years ago before the Cain and Davidoff study
was published.
8. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study
of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2009).
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substantively more formalistic contract law. 9 In this later work, law
and economics scholars, including Jody Kraus and Robert Scott, relied
on empirical evidence of a flight to support the new formalist view
that courts should reject contextualism since the parties' flight to New
York law demonstrates a formalistic preference. 10 Their hypothesis
was built on earlier scholarship using models to show that utility-maximizing commercial firms would prefer formalistic contract law, and
then supposed that the flight to New York law reflected that
preference. 11
Scott and Kraus hypothesized that parties use strategic thinking in
choosing the law to govern an agreement to protect planning with respect to all of the terms in the contract. 12 The choice of law is made to
ensure that courts use formal contract doctrine in interpreting all of
the contract terms that have been carefully negotiated and chosen ex
ante. 13 This hypothesis rests on a general view that lawyers carefully
construct contracts and wish to guard against courts using their discretion to interpret contracts or fill in terms for the parties, absent express party direction.14
A rival hypothesis of contract drafting in contract theory (developed outside the M&A context) posits that clients and lawyers pay
almost no attention to the terms of the contract ex ante. Instead, lawyers simply copy language from a prior agreement without much
thought. The decision to copy prior language unreflectively stems
from the lawyer's disinclination to spend time on a provision or term
that will be difficult to bill to the client. 15 Claire Hill, Mitu Gulati, and
Robert Scott documented this theory of contract drafting in non-

9. Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent,
84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1023 (2009). Professor Scott cites the Eisenberg and Miller studies as "illustrat[ing) the strong preference of commercial parties for the formal contract law of New York in
lieu of frequent exercise of equitable overrides by courts in California." Id. at 1062. As Kraus
and Scott explain: "The strong preference of sophisticated parties for New York contract law is
consistent with our claim that those parties prefer an adjudicatory system that consistently applies formal doctrine, absent the parties' express indication otherwise at the time of formation. "
Id. at 1093. Professors Kraus and Scott were referring to a larger array of contracts and not the
merger agreements but if that is so, that would raise the question, why the merger agreement
context would engender different results on the formality issue.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 1061-62.
12. See Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1074.
13. See id. at 1026.
14. See id.
15. But see discussion with Lawyer 5 who took strong exception to this picture of corporate
transactional drafting. Interview with Lawyer 5 (Nov. 6, 2013) (on file with author).
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M&A contexts.1 6 Based on empirical studies, they conclude that clients will not pay for bespoke drafting unless the costs of the standard
language clearly pose so many risks as to outweigh the drafting costs.
In addition, introducing terms different from those of a prior agreement may lengthen expensive negotiations. The cost-benefit analysis
favors leaving terms the same in light of the expense of making
changes and the rare chance of complications.
I begin my research with another hypothesis of contract drafting
that falls into neither the Kraus/Scott strategic model nor the unreflective copying model. The hypothesis states that lawyers deliberately
make the particular choice of law provision, not because of any substantive aspects of contract law in a particular jurisdiction, but because
of the lawyers' internal professional concerns in relation to avoiding .
malpractice. I surmise that because lawyers would want to ensure that •
they are knowledgeable with the chosen law to avoid any liability for
malpractice that might come with specifying the law of a jurisdiction
with which they are unfamiliar, 17 lawyers will specify a choice of law
with which they or a member of their firm are familiar. However, the
data demonstrates that lawyers seem comfortable with the law of both
Delaware and New York, 18 and that they may be comfortable with the
16. Claire A. Hill, What Mistakes Do Lawyers Make in Complex Contracts, and What Can and
Should be Done About Them? Some Preliminary Thoughts, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS
SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 224, 229-30
(Jean Braucher et al., ed., 2013) (discussing how in securitization contracts many provisions became standardized and inserted into the contracts without much review). Mitu Gulati and Robert Scott document a similar pattern in the context of explaining the persistence of a version of
the pari passu clause in sovereign debt contracts despite an adverse court decision. See M1Tu
GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE
AND TH E LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 73-88 (2013). They explained the failure to change the
clause in terms of the costs of redrafting. Id. at 38. They also developed keen insights from
lawyer interviews into the causes of the "stickiness" of the offending clause. Id. at 79. These
works by Hill, Gulati and Scott represent in depth examinations of contract drafting in the context of actual lawyers conducting deals. They set a high bar and provide a paradigm for future
work in the area.
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 5.5 (a lawyer can engage in multidistrict practice when they gain a pro hac vice admission to appear in that court or when they are providing
"legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that . . . (2) are in or reasonably related to
a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer,
or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or
reasonably expects to be so authorized; (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential
arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires
pro hac vice admission[.]")
18. See Kirkland M&A Update: Delaware vs. New York Governing Law - Six of One, Half
Dozen of Other?, KIRKLAND & ELLIS 1 (Dec. 17, 2013), available at http://www.kirkland.com/site
Files/Publications/MAUpdate_121713.pdf (" [w]hile the outcome on most issues [in purchase
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contract law of other jurisdictions without necessarily being licensed
to practice law in it, 19 with the exception of Alabama and California,
which seem to be outlier jurisdictions.20 Lawyers seem comfortable
with several possibilities for a choice of law.21 Since lawyers seem
comfortable with both New York and Delaware law, without necessarily being licensed in those jurisdictions, the desire to avoid malpractice cannot account for the difference between lawyers choosing New
York versus Delaware law.
The Article's final hypothesis of contract drafting (and lawyering)
though falls somewhat in the middle between the Kraus and Scott position of carefully tailored strategic choice of law provisions and the
Hill, Gulati, and Scott unreflective copying model. It is that lawyers
put a moderate level of thought into choice of law provisions, and that
the choice is very contextual. Lawyers do spend some thought on the
choice of law provision-it is not simply copied or ignored. This degree of thought is evidenced by the fact that some lawyers use different states' governing law in different merger agreements. But, deep
thought is not given to the matter either. Lawyers' comfort with a
range of governing laws, seeking to avoid only one or two jurisdictions, contributes to the lack of deep thought. This theory of contract
drafting in merger agreements rejects the hypothesis that the choice of
law is done strategically to choose a formalist law to protect planning
with respect to all of the terms in the contract. Lawyers making
choice of law decisions in merger agreements think strategically in a
narrow sense (for example, which sandbagging provision applies) at
times, but do not seem to think strategically in a broad sense that conagreements] is unlikely to differ significantly between Delaware and New York," there are some
notable exceptions.)
19. This might be especially true if the lawyer did not need to deliver an opinion. Lawyer 2
noted that some jurisdictions are frowned on, including California due to problems with enforcing non-compete covenants, Massachusetts due to being not viewed as business friendly, and
Louisiana due to its civil code. Interview with Lawyer 2 (Nov. 15, 2013) (on file with author).
My survey data confirmed that being licensed in the jurisdiction ranked very low with lawyers as
a reason for choosing a particular jurisdiction 's law to govern the agreement. In agreements
where New York law was chosen, 11 out of 47 respondents ranked the law firm having an office
in the jurisdiction as the least important reason for the choice of law in an agreement. In agreements where Delaware was chosen, 32 out of 70 respondents ranked "having an office in Delaware" as the least important reason for selecting Delaware law.
20. Lawyer 1 raised questions about Alabama's jury system. Interview with Lawyer 1 (Nov.
11, 2013) (on file with author).
21. Lawyer 8 explained that the basic choice of law came down to four options: the acquiring
party's primary executive office, the state of incorporation, New York law, and Delaware law.
Interview with Lawyer 8 (Oct. 22, 2013) (on file with author) . Lawyer 2 stated that choice of law
usually came down to Delaware, New York or the state in which the target is incorporated.
Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 19.
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siders all aspects of the contract. Although there may be sound reasons to suppose any of these theories were correct,22 surveying
lawyers on this decision would be the only way to resolve the issue.
To find out more about why contracts specify New York law or another jurisdiction's law I used empirical data by (1) interviewing a select group of fifteen merger and acquisition lawyers,23 and (2)
conducting a survey sent to 812 mergers and acquisitions lawyers located throughout the country. 24 The evidence determines whether
data supports that commercial firms make choice of law decisions
based on a strategic desire for formalistic law,25 unthinking copying,
lawyer malpractice concerns, or a hybrid theory of moderate thought.
This study reveals three important findings: (1) there is no single
overarching or predominant reason lawyers give for choosing the law
of a particular jurisdiction to govern a merger agreement; (2) lawyers,
not clients, make the choice of law decision; and (3) the particular
context matters in the choice of law decision.
II.
A.

METHODOLOGY

Phase One: Interview A Select Group Of Lawyers In The
Mergers And Acquisitions Field

The first phase of the research consisted of qualitative background
interviews with fifteen mergers and acquisitions attorneys to find out
more about how they think about, and choose, the law to govern a
22. The decision on choice of law may resemble many other contractual choices that demanded some thought but are not contentious or a deal-breaker. That approach to drafting may
be different with a standard boilerplate contract. In such contexts, as clearly shown by Gulati
and Scott, there are a number of reasons why "stickiness" and a reluctance to vary the terms at
all will prevail. See GULATI & Scorr, supra note 16, at 33-43. For a fascinating and closely
analyzed discussion of the reasons for stickiness in such contracts, see id.
23. Bill Whitford emphasized the importance of speaking to lawyers rather than just sending
out paper surveys. Interview with William Whitford, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin,
School of Law (Mar. 4, 2013) (on file with author). Stewart Macaulay continues to conduct this
type of research with great effect ever since his study of Wisconsin businessmen revealed the
non-use of contract law in their business transactions. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM: Soc . REv. 55 (1963). My own view is that it
was by talking to lawyers that a picture of the lawyering involved in the choice of law emerged.
24. The data set was compiled from the SEC EDGAR database and identified merger agreements entered into between January 1, 2011 and June 30, 2011. By looking at the notice provisions in the M&A agreements, my assistants identified 812 lawyers who worked on the
agreements and were entitled to receive notifications and documents. We then compiled an
email list of all the lawyers. We sent a hard copy of a letter to all 812 lawyers inviting them to
participate in the study either by filling out a hard copy of the survey or by accessing a survey via
the web. We guaranteed that the results would be anonymous. The majority of responses were
by hard copy although some answered using a survey on the web.
25. See Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1103.
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merger agreement. These interviews were off the record and I kept
the results anonymous by recording them as "Interview #1," "Interview #2," and etc. It was my hope that the preliminary phase of talking to lawyers, preferably after they had taken a draft of the survey,
could proceed without any need to get a formal, signed consent or get
Institutional Review Board ("IRB") approval. 26 The university's IRB
office agreed that no consent form was required.
The interviews were with mergers and acquisitions ("M&A") lawyers I know or to whom I was referred by lawyers I know. Former
students also provided helpful referrals. The interviews provided useful information about how to craft a survey. I hoped to increase the
chance of getting a good response rate on the survey (the second
phase of the project) by interviewing lawyers and getting their reactions to a draft survey. These lawyers' comments resulted in adjustments, and hopefully improvements, to the initial survey.
B.

Phase Two: Conduct Survey Of All 812 Lawyers From 343
Merger Agreements27

The second phase of research involved a survey ("the survey") of all
of the 812 lawyers who worked on the selected set of merger agreements. The names and addresses of the lawyers are public information from the SEC EDGAR database. The merger agreements
themselves are accessible to the public via the SEC EDGAR
database. 28
I wrote to these 812 lawyers and gave them the opportunity to respond by mailing back a hard copy of the survey or by taking the
survey online using Qualtrics. 29 One hundred nine survey responses
came back. 3 0 The survey response rate was 13.4%. 31 This is an admit26. I initially thought that the interviews with lawyers might require university approval
through the IRB process and feared the IRB consent form would be a hindrance for lawyers
participating. In fact, after speaking to a professor who has conducted interviews of lawyers, it
became apparent that the lawyers found the consent form, the time spent on describing my
commitment to confidentiality and the effort of getting the signed consent form annoying. Interview with Ann Southworth, Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law
(Mar. 6, 2013).
27. This comprehensive survey meant that I did not need to worry about a particular group of
lawyers on one side of the transaction skewing the survey results.
28. Important Information About EDGAR, SEC (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/edgar/
aboutedgar.htm.
29. Conversations with other scholars, who are experts in survey data, convinced me that I
would get a better number of responses with a hard copy mailing than with an online survey.
30. However, not all respondents answered every question.
31. The response rate is low enough that a statistician might suggest that the results of the
study cannot be used to estimate what the response rate would be for the whole population of

220

DEPAUL BUSINESS

&

COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:211

tedly low response rate but since this is the only survey that has systematically studied the lawyers responsible for drafting the choice of
law provision in merger agreements, it may be a significant beginning
in the conversation and perhaps provide a foundation for future
studies. 32
The results of the survey were to remain anonymous. The Information Technology Services Department at Case Western Reserve University assured me that the surveys could be filled out so that the
results could not be traced back to any particular lawyer. Because the
lawyers who would receive the survey are extremely sophisticated and
are representing public companies in drafting merger agreements in
transactions that need to be reported to the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), we had to assuage any fears that their answers
would be discoverable in later litigation involving any merger transaction. This guarantee of anonymity was necessary to generate a decent
participation rate.
The Qualtrics program used to conduct the survey is a robust survey
tool that has been successfully used by Case Western Reserve School
of Law in prior data collection. It allows for anonymity, yet also permits monitoring to determine whether surveys have been started or
completed, without disclosing the identity of the survey taker. Also, it
ensures that only the recipient to whom the survey was sent can fill
out the survey, thereby preserving the integrity of the research results.
C.

Phase Three: Evaluate Sample And Analyze Results

In order for the study to be valid, the sample had to be an informed
group in which the lawyers actually had to confront and think about
the choice of law issue. In addition to the fact that respondent lawyers
were chosen based on their experience with mergers and acquisitions,
Questions 9 and 11 support that the sample was valid-sixty-six of 104
respondents chose New York law in at least one merger agreement, 33
while ninety-nine of 103 choose Delaware in at least one merger
agreement. 34 There is substantial overlap because the same respondents answered both questions; since 96.12% chose Delaware, most of
M&A lawyers. However, I have a big enough response rate that if there were a consistent and
strong pattern, such as all lawyers wanting a formalist jurisdiction, it would show up.
32. I would be happy to share my email lists, list of lawyers, and survey form , all contact
information as well as the list of transactions/deals covered by my 2011 survey with other
scholars.
33. See infra Appendix Question 9 (sixty-six respondents answered "yes" to "(h]as there been
a merger agreement where you have chosen New York law? ").
34. See infra Appendix Question 11 (ninety-nine respondents answered "yes" to " (h] as there
been a merger agreement where you have chosen Delaware law?").
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the 63.46% that chose New York also chose Delaware on at least one
occasion. The fact that a majority of respondent lawyers choose different laws on different occasions supports the fact that they have to
choose and think about choice of law, verifying the validity of the
sample and negating the drafting model of unreflective copying.
After the surveys were returned, I was able to schedule additional
interviews with M&A lawyers. I then gathered the information acquired from both the interviews and the surveys to evaluate what determines choice of law in merger agreements. This comprehensive
analysis yielded the following results.
III.

THE PRINCIPAL- AGENT PROBLEM AND OTHER INTENT ISSUES

An important caveat to understanding choice of law provisions in
contracts, and what that choice can tell us about lawyering and its relevance for discerning the choice the clients/principals are making in
the transactions, pertains to who makes the choice and what the process of the choice is like. Without research on that process, one might
erroneously conclude that a party's intent for choice of law is clear
when an explicit provision exists. However, the meaning or intent underlying choice of law provisions in merger agreements can be unclear
for a number of reasons. The principal-agent relationship is particularly tricky factor in this arena. Further, intent may be unclear in the
case of a corporation without a single brain, but mixed motives for the
same decision, which makes my evaluation difficult. 35 Such issues impact choice of law theories and must be considered when evaluating
the significance of such provisions.
A.

The Principal-Agent Relationship Yields Significant Implications
In Determining The "Party's" Intent

Perhaps the most significant finding of the survey is reflected in the
answers to Questions 17 and 18 addressing to what extent the choice
of laws are client-driven versus law-firm driven. In Question 17, the
respondents were asked to attach a percentage to indicate the percent
to which the client determines choice of law. Sixty-four of 100 respondents said it is 0%, 10%, or 20% client-driven (19, 24, and 21 respondents, respectively). 36 Only 4% responded that the decision was 80%,
35. The analysis of the complexity of choice in contracts involving principals and agents has
implications for other determinations of choice or intent as in contract interpretation.
36. See infra Appendix Question 17.
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90%, or 100% client-driven. 37 Similarly, in Question 18, sixty-eight of
100 respondents said choice of law is 70% , 80%, 90%, or 100% law
firm-driven (16, 18, 17, and 17, respectively). 38 Clearly, the data overwhelmingly supports the view that lawyers are making the determination about choice of law, not the client.
When a court looks at a party's agreement in any context, it is subsuming into what it calls "the party's intent"-all of the conscious and
unconscious decisions that are actually made by the party's agents and
advisors, without those persons necessarily, and in fact usually not,
informing the principal. The agent's decisions are made are without
the principal's knowledge or understanding of the decision or its implications, and yet are imputed to the principal. Under these circumstances, what kind of choice or intent can we attribute to the principal
when the lawyer survey results indicate that the lawyer, not the client,
made the choice?
In the context of choice of law in merger agreements, lawyers cite a
number of reasons for why they may want a particular governing law
regardless of the clients' intent, 39 and the survey clearly demonstrates
that lawyers are making this decision-not the client. What is left
open for debate is whether this should affect determination of what
the "party's" intent was in drafting a choice of law provision. Is the
lawyer's intent sufficient for demonstrating the client's intent, or is the
client's intent not clear in the absence of the client being involved in
this decision?
Additionally, agency-cost problems are intertwined with the dynamics of the principal-agent relationship, further illustrating the potential
conflict for intent in the principal-agent relationship in the context of
choice of law provisions in merger agreements. The agency-cost problem develops when the interests of the lawyer and the company are
not coterminous. 40 As O'Hara and Ribstein posit, "[a]gency costs exist whenever power is delegated to agent. "41 A lawyer is the client's
delegate, yet the lawyer might be concerned with having a choice of
law with predictability that lowers the costs of understanding laws
outside the lawyer's jurisdiction, and therefore be driven to choose a
37. Interview with Lawyer 4 (May 1, 2013) (on file with author). The small role played by
clients in the choice of law contrasts with the interviews indicating that clients care about the
choice of venue or forum.
38. See infra Appendix Question 18.
39. See infra Appendix Question 12 (citing expertise of judges in Delaware).
40. Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF Bus1NESS 55 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., 1990).
41. See Erin A . O 'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67
U. Cm. L. REv. 1151, 1157 (2000).
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law with which the lawyer is familiar, even if the substantive rule at
issue is a costly one to the client. Rather than choosing an unfamiliar
jurisdiction, the lawyer might prefer crafting a clause around any substantive rule the client wished to avoid, even if it required additional
lawyer time. Although potentially producing a choice of law satisfactory to both the lawyer and client, its creation would result in more
billable hours for the law firm and more cost for the client. Further,
regardless of whether the lawyer's provision accounted for the client's
substantive rule concerns, the law chosen may still not be the client's
intended choice.
A follow-up survey could shed more light on the diverging interests
between lawyers and clients. We must know more about what lawyers
tell clients about choice of law. We must also know what clients tell
lawyers, such as whether they tell lawyers to handle the matter as a
matter of boilerplate,42 or whether they broadly delegate the decision
to the lawyers. Further, do clients set any parameters on the lawyer's
choice of law recommendation or determination, or is the lawyer free
to make the decision for the client? Differences in answers to these
questions in a future study will determine to what extent the choice of
law reflects a client's preference as opposed to a lawyer's preference.
B.

Can A Commercial Firm have Intent?

Putting aside the principal-agent issue, is a commercial firm even
capable of manifesting intent, except in the case of the sole proprietor? The principal-agent issue brings about a potential problem of determining the client's intent when the lawyer makes the decision.
However, even if the lawyer does not make the decision, and the client makes the decision, who can speak for the client's intent in the
case of a corporation? In the case of a sole proprietor, it is clear there
is one owner and this owner is the client. However, in the case of a
corporation, there may be a person within the corporation appointed
to make certain decisions. Is this person's decision as to choice of law
necessarily representative of the corporation's (the client's) decision,
or is it merely a single person's decision? Further, should the law assess the choice differently with a sole proprietor than a corporation, or
should it automatically accept that a corporation's decision-maker
represents the intent of the corporation?

42. Lawyer 13 indicated that the choice of law "is not given any conscientious thought." Interview with Lawyer 13 (Nov. 21 , 2013) (on file with author).
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Forum D rives Law: Intent For Forum B ut Unclear
Intent For Law?

The survey demonstrates that lawyers think choice of forum influences choice of law. Thirty-four percent of respondents thought that
the forum had a significant impact on the choice of law while 51 %
thought the forum choice had a moderate impact on the choice of
law.43 This raises the question that if choice of law is determined by
choice of forum, is there actually intent behind the choice of law decision, or is the choice of law decision merely a result of choice of forum
with no conscious thought? Let us first look at why choice of forum
influences choice of law.
One key reason choice of forum influences choice of law is that
lawyers do not like to bifurcate. A lawyer can legally bifurcate and
specify one forum to litigate and another law to govern the agreement. 44 For example, a deal can have an Ohio forum applying Delaware law. 45 However, one lawyer said that she never bifurcated
choice of law and choice of forum issues. 46 This lawyer's concern is
that if there is an Ohio forum but Delaware choice of law, the Ohio
court will place an Ohio "spin" to the Delaware law. Because some
counsel fear that a court of one jurisdiction might not properly apply
the law of another jurisdiction, there might be an unwillingness to select a forum that is different from the governing law.
Another lawyer articulated a different reason choice of forum might
influence choice of law: many of the same issues will drive both forum
and law decisions because many transactional lawyers do not always
distinguish the two choices. If they are not distinguished, the relative
importance of forum versus law may determine which one influences
the other.
A key point I learned from counsel interviews is that clients care
about forum more than they care about the choice of law issue. 47 Two
43. See infra Appendix Question 1.
44. For example, an Ohio forum applying D elaware Jaw.
45. This would be the result under the internal affairs doctrine.
46. Lawyer 1 suggested that she never bifurcates forum and choice of Jaw. Interview with
Lawyer 1, supra note 20. Presumably, she always includes both a choice of forum and choice of
law. Id. This is consistent with a result in the Eisenberg and Miller study. See Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 4, at 1503 (" [w]hen a forum is specifie d, it overwhelmingly corresponds with a
contract's choice of Jaw.").
47. Lawyer 7 suggested clients might care more about fo rum beca use of the potential costs of
having to litigate in an inconvenie nt place, and the quality of lawyers in D elaware. Interview
with Lawyer 7 (Oct. 23, 2013) (on fil e with author). Lawyer 11 indica ted that what matters is
forum, not choice of law. Interview with Lawyer 11 (Oct. 22, 2013) (on file with author) . Lawyer 8 confirmed, "clients generally seem more concerned with venue than choice of substantive
law." Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 21.
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interviewed lawyers explained that their clients worried about litigation costs48 and the quality of lawyering in a jurisdiction. 49 Those concerns might drive the choice of a forum so as to minimize expense by
the client, such as travel costs. Further, some situations may call for a
specific forum for other reasons; one lawyer indicated that he thought
that there was a strong pressure for the forum to be Delaware to send
the case to the experts. 50
The context of agreements can cause choosing forum ahead of time
to be particularly important in certain situations.51 Forum selection
clauses may be most prevalent in two types of contracts. The first type
is an adhesion contract, which potential defendants (such as cruise
lines) insist on a pro-defendant choice of forum ahead of time to foreclose any plaintiffs from having the advantage of filing in a jurisdiction
that is more favorable to plaintiffs. 52 The second type of contract involves parties who are relatively equal in bargaining strength and
reach agreement on a forum so that going forward neither party can
threaten to take the other party to an unfavorable forum as a way of
gaining concessions.53
One lawyer who participated in the interviews said that forum
might matter in choice of law where a client wants a rocket docket,
such as in Virginia.54 In this case, if the lawyer is choosing a particular
forum for a procedural advantage, it may influence the choice of law,
48. Lawyer 8 said venue issues could potentially add costs because of need to engage local
counsel and pay travel costs. Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 21.
49. Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 47. "Why NY forum? Once you need to go to court
in Delaware, would need to engage local Delaware lawyers and not that many great ones." Id.
50. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15.
51. As Professor Robertson points out, there are reasons why particular subset of defendants
might want to insist on forum selection clauses in their contracts. Email from Cassandra Robertson, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky,
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Nov. 18, 2013, 15:17 EST)
(on file with author).
I think that in spite of the forum non conveniens doctrine, the plaintiff still wields a lot
of power in deciding where to file suit initially. So forum selection clauses are especially valuable to potential defendants, but are more valuable for avoiding unfavorable
fora than affirmatively choosing favorable ones (even though the effect of the clause is
to choose one-parties may choose New York or London as the forum, but they probably care more about avoiding Alabama than they care whether they actually litigate in
New York or London) .
Id.
52. See, e.g. , Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
53. See Email from Cassandra Robertson to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 51.
54. Interview with Lawyer 9 (Apr. 25, 2013) (on file with author). See Heather Russell Koenig, The Eastern District of Virginia: A Working Solution for Civillustice Reform, 32 U. R1cH. L.
REV. 799 (1998) (discussing the efficiencies of a single federal court).

226

DEPAUL BusINESs

& COMMERCIAL LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. 13:211

especially if there is any concern about bifurcating the forum and the
choice of law.
Whether parties insist on forum provisions generally55 can involve
the context, identity of the parties, and subsequently, whether there
are particular advantages and/or disadvantages in failing to choose a
forum ahead of time.
With this perspective, we can circle back to the question of whether
the influence of forum on law affects the intent behind a choice of law
provision. We know that lawyers do not like to split forum and law
because they avoid bifurcating, and sometimes do not even distinguish
forum from law. We also know that clients are much more concerned
with forum than they are with law, especially in certain situations. So,
choice of law may be made as a default to a choice of forum. In such a
scenario, is choice of law a conscious decision being made with intent
behind that decision? Or is it merely a provision that is not expressly
thought about, and therefore has no unequivocal intent behind it?
One could argue either way. The implications are consequential not
just to choice of law provisions in merger agreements, but any contractual provision that may not be consciously thought about for various reasons.
Essentially, the question is whether there is a level of thought necessary to manifest intent. If there is, the various theories of drafting
choice of law provisions become even more important. Under the formalist theory, the choice is a conscious strategic decision. But under
the unthinking copying theory, the choice is not even considered. If
conscious thought is required to manifest intent, and the provision is
merely copied, could the provision be successfully challenged in litigation? A further study could reveal more about the relationship between choice of forum and choice of law, and the implications of this
relationship.
D.

Mixed Motives for the Same Decision

In large merger agreements, there are many players on both sides
making decisions, and many subjective reasons behind these decisions.
If multiple people have the same desire for a particular issue, but have
different underlying reasons why they share this desire, their differences in reasoning may rtot affect the ultimate result. For example,
one individual lawyer working for "Law Firm A" may choose a provision for reasons of convenience while another lawyer working for Law

i I
,, I

55. I do not have the data on how many parties in merger agreements choose forum as well as
choice of law.
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Firm A may choose the same provision but for a completely different
reason. The second lawyer may have found the provision in a prior
agreement and favor adopting it without much thought or motive.
Another may choose that provision because of personal comfort with
that jurisdiction and malpractice concerns. Yet, another lawyer may
agree to it because her client has indicated that it is not a dealbreaker, or the lawyer may not know whether the choice of law proposed by the other side is objectionable and therefore cannot tell her
client not to agree to it.
In such a situation, the different motives for each lawyer may be
inconsequential if the same final result is reached. However, for our
purposes of studying why lawyers act the way they do in relation to
choice of law in merger agreements, such situations raise difficulty deciphering what the motive was for the choice that was made, if different parties had different motives for the same decision. These
situations are common with choice of law in merger agreements, making it difficult to put the choice of law into one of the various hypotheses without understanding more about the complexities of choosing.

E. Implications of Intent Issues for Formalist Theory
The fact that lawyers and not commercial firms are choosing the law
to govern the agreement undermines an important claim of the new
formalists. 56 The logical progression of the new formalist argument is
that to the extent that commercial parties are choosing New York law
in greater numbers and fleeing Delaware they are embracing "the formal contract law of New York. "57 However, there are intent problems
with the idea that commercial firms are choosing New York for formalism. First, commercial firms are not deciding choice of law-their
lawyers are deciding. 58 Second, even if the commercial firms are deciding, there is no single brain making choices for such a firm except
in the case of a sole proprietorship, leaving an unclear intent for the
firm as a whole. Further, if clients care more about venue than choice
of law, then it becomes harder to argue that the commercial firms are
56. If the clients were directing the lawyers' choice, then it might still be possible to argue that
the choice of law represents the firm's choice. However, because of a possible divergence in
interests, the lawyer may not simply implement the client's wishes. See infra Part IV. Alternatively, the client may not care about the choice of law and simply instruct the lawyer to make the
choice. If that is the case, the choice of Jaw does not represent a commercial firm 's choice. See
also supra Part II.
57. See Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1062.
58. This would be true in my survey but it may not be the case in the broader array of contracts studied by Eisenberg and Miller and referenced by Kraus and Scott. Further work could
be done surveying the lawyers drafting the broader array of contracts.
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choosing formalistic contract law in order to "economize on contracting costs." 59 If the lawyers are making the choice, what can we
surmise about how much their choice reflects concerns of the client
company and how much the choice reflects the lawyers' own concerns
and preferences?60
Many of the arguments for preferring formalistic contract law are
been built on a model of what most commercial firms hypothetically
prefer. 61 Recent empirical studies showing a flight to New York are
cited as confirmatory evidence of the preference of commercial firms
for a formalistic law. Scholars rely on the combination of the hypothetical preference and the empirical data to provide the foundation
for a much larger claim that courts should normatively follow formalism and reject contextualism since that is what commercial parties
prefer.
However, if the choice of law in the merger agreement is not the
commercial firm's choice but the lawyer's choice, the choice of governing law by itself tells us little about what choice commercial firms
would make or are making. Therefore, given the data collected showing a clear indication that the lawyer is making the choice, one can no
longer rely on the formalist theory to assume that by enforcing choice
of law the corporation's preference is being implemented.
IV.

A.

NEW YORK

vs.

DELAWARE: COMPARISON AND IMPLIC ATIONS

Lawyers are Comfortable with Both Delaware and New York
Contract Law, but are More Comfortable with Delaware

Lawyers in the survey report greater comfort with Delaware contract law than New York contract law. 62 When asked to "select a
phrase to describe how comfortable you, or a member of your firm,
are with Delaware law" with the options of "very comfortable"; "comfortable"; "probably comfortable"; and "very uncomfortable," the op59. Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1028-29.
60. The possibility that there could be a disjunction between the client and the lawyer arises in
the related choice of forum. As one scholar says, "[p]roblems initially occur when any divergence of interest arises between the client and the attorney." Michael J. Maloney & Allison
Taylor Blizzard, Ethical Issues in the Context of International Litigation: "Where Angels Fear to
Tread", 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 933, 950-51 (1995); see also SusAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES:
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE (2002).
61. Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1061. See also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Th eory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 556 (2003) (discussing interpretation
that courts "should facilitate the ability of firms to maximize welfare "); see also id. at 573-574
(discussing firms' interpretive preferences) (emphasis added).
62. See Lawyer 6 indicated that " [i]f you are a Kansas lawyer, you are comfortable with Delaware but not New York Jaw." Interview with Lawyer 6 (Sept. 13, 2013) (on file with author).
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tions generated 66; 26; 12; and 1 selections, respectively. The
corresponding question for New York law generated 57; 30; 15; and 3
selections, respectively.
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The first question to ask about these results is: are these results surprising or significant, and what may they explain? Second, how do the
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results relate to the Article's hypothesis that lawyers devote a moderate amount of time to the choice, are fairly comfortable with the common law of most jurisdictions (except outlier ones), and that context
and particular issues drive the choice of law rather than a strategic
choice?
As to the first question, one lawyer63 said that lawyers at big law
firms in the 1990s would not have said that they were more familiar
with Delaware contract law than New York contract law. Yet, survey
data shows that 64% of respondents said that they were very comfortable with Delaware contract law, whereas only 56% of respondents
selected the same as to New York contract law. This raises the question of what lawyers mean by comfort with the law of a jurisdiction,
and how and why the lawyers' comfort level with the law of a jurisdiction affects the choice of law.
One lawyer drew a distinction between being generally comfortable
with New York law in the sense of being knowledgeable enough to
avoid malpractice, and possessing the degree of expertise required to
render an opinion. 64 This lawyer would not be comfortable enough
with New York contract law to give an opinion or draft a complaint.65
However, the lawyer does not feel the need to be familiar with all
aspects of the law because the lawyer can employ a Lex Mundi law
firm that has a branch office in every state. 66
When lawyers say their comfort level with Delaware contract law is
high, it may be because they think that the Delaware contract law that
matter the most are limited provisions such as the material adverse
change ("MAC") clause67 and the no-shop clause, 68 which are related
63. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. Most lawyers do not consider themselves experts
in Delaware contract law but are comfortable with New York law because a partner or a firm is
an expert. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54.
64. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 20.
65. Id.; see e.g., infra Part IV.
66. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 20; See Member Firm Locations, LEX MuNDI, available at www.lexmundi.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (website for global law firm) .
67. See STEPHEN I. GLOVER ET AL., M&A PRACTICE GUIDE§ 12.04(1]-(3]. A closing condition of a purchase agreement typically provides that there be no material adverse changes since
the agreement was signed. Id. at § 12.04(2) (explaining that "a buyer invoking the failure of a
MAC condition must meet a high burden to prove that a MAC has occurred").
68. Id. at § 1.04 ("The no-shop/exclusivity agreement provides that the target and its owners
will not discuss the possibility of transaction with any other party while negotiations are underway."). See also EDWIN L. MILLER, JR., MERGERS AND Ac omsnioNs: A STEP-BY-STEP LEGAL
AND PRACTICAL GUIDE 248 (2008) (explaining that these clauses "come in multiple strengths
.. . ."). Lawyer 6 said that, in public deals, "one of the most litigated issues is corporate fiduciary
duty. That duty might involve when you have to shop the transaction. " Interview with Lawyer
6, supra note 62. That lawyer found the "legal standard in Massachusetts" to be "opaque and
not as clearly stated as in Delaware." Id.
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to corporate law issues. Since most lawyers are comfortable with the
Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), 69 they may indicate
that they perhaps are also comfortable with Delaware contract law. 70
Expressions of comfort with Delaware contract law by a lawyer may
also mean that he is just saying no one hears anything untoward about
Delaware contract law in the way that parties hear bad things about
California law. 71 It may also be a lack of experience by the lawyer
with Delaware contract law.72
The Berkshire Hathaway acquisition of Burlington Northern illustrates the comfort level with Delaware contract law and its implications in an agreement. 73 The choice of law was Delaware. Although
both companies were Delaware corporations, no Delaware lawyers
were in the deal. There was no strategic choice of New York law for
formalism, nor was the choice made because of a need to be licensed
in the chosen jurisdiction. This demonstrates the comfort level of a
New York and a California law firm with a Delaware choice of law
provision.
TCo.
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A Co.
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So what explains the choice of law for Delaware? Since Berkshire
Hathaway ("BH") already owned a chunk of Burlington Northern
("BN") and would be subject to internal affairs scrutiny,74 the firms
were more comfortable having Delaware law govern than having the
agreement scrutinized under New York law either in a New York forum or another forum. Because lawyers do not like to bifurcate law
and forum, 75 New York law would result in a New York forum, but
69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8.
70. A recent paper suggests that this confidence in Delaware contract law may not be warranted and that "the virtues of Delaware courts in corporate law contexts may make them less
than ideal at doing the ordinary work of resolving contract law disputes." John C. Coates, Managing Disputes Through Contract: Evidence from M&A, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 295, 335 (2012).
71. See Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15 (regarding California courts purporting to
govern Delaware corporations).
72. See Coates, supra note 70, at 308-09.
73. Berkshire Hathaware bought all shares of Burlington Northern Sante Fe Corporation in a
$44 billion deal; Bershire's largest acquisition. Michael J. De la Merced, Berkshire Best on U.S.
with a Railroad Purchase, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/ll/03/
berkshire-to-buy-rest-of-burlington-northern-for-44-billion/?_r=l; Associated Press, Berkshire
Completes Acquisition of BNSF Railroad, CLEVELAND (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.cleveland
.com/business/index.ssf/2010/02/berkshire_completes_acquisitio.html.
74. See supra note 6 and accompanying material.
75. See supra Part III.C.
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the court would defer to Delaware law under the internal affairs doctrine. Lawyers might fear that New York courts will misapply the
Delaware law on the very important corporate issues. Accordingly,
the parties will typically prefer to have Delaware law govern, preferably in a Delaware forum, even if neither law firm is a Delaware firm.
In addition, BN was an acquisition of a public company. After BH
acquired the rest of the BN that it originally did not hold from the
public, there was no reason to have the representations or indemnities
survive the transaction. And, the agreement said that the representations and warranties would not survive the merger. The most important provisions would be the MAC clause and the no-shop provision,
and both lawyers would be very comfortable with Delaware law governing these corporate issues. 76 Most law firms, including the New
York and California firms in this deal, seem fairly comfortable with
Delaware contract law, consistent with the survey.
A future study could include a question on the structure of the
merger to determine whether it was a true merger or a non-true
merger. With this information, one could determine how that deal
structure affected the answer to the comfort with New York and/or
Delaware contract law.
Another explanation for greater comfort with Delaware contract
law over New York contract law is based on the relationship between
forum and law. Lawyers may simply be more comfortable with how
the Delaware Chancery Court will respond, and see the New York
court as unpredictable. To avoid bifurcating, Delaware may be favored as the choice of law. A future study could also ask about what
contract provisions matter in M&A agreements and ask the lawyers
whether they differ significantly in Delaware and New York for buyers and sellers.
It may also, according to Professors Cain and Davidoff, be due to
events that preceded my survey, such as the fallout from the
ConEdison decision and the 2008 financial recession. 77
Finally, although more lawyers expressed being comfortable with
Delaware than New York contract law, other lawyers still expressed a
comfort with the contract law of both jurisdictions. One reason for
the mutual comfort may be underlying structural factors that ensure
76. The choice of law decisions seems to be made at the micro level rather than at the macro
level.
77. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 7, at 94-95 (discussing Consol. Edison v. Ne. Utils., 426
F.3d 524, 531 (2d Cir. 2005)). The refusal of the New York court in ConEdison to allow target
shareholders to sue for the share premium made some lawyers wary of choosing New York law
in merger agreements.
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that there will be few contract issues that arise in merger agreements.
These possible factors might determine when the choice of law, including contract law, might be important. For a large number of true
mergers, the new public company merges out of the former public
company as a subsidiary. In these cases, few contract provisions survive the merger, so the only provisions that will matter would be those
involving events that occur prior to the merger, such as the MAC
clause and the no-shop provision.
On the other hand, with non-true mergers, where the merger company is not public, there will be continuing obligations to the shareholder/parent such as representations, warranties, and a possible
continuation of services, all of which will implicate contract law.78
In these situations the answer to whether one felt more comfortable
with New York or Delaware contract law might depend on whether
you need to be concerned with matters that go beyond corporate related issues, such as the MAC clause and the no-shop provision, and
involve representations and warranties which survive the closing. For
those lawyers involved primarily in true mergers, the number of contract issues will be small and mostly concerned with the time prior to
the closing.7 9 Because those issues are likely to be confined to the
MAC clause and the no-shop provision, if the lawyer is confident on
how those two issues will be resolved, the lawyer might express a high
degree of confidence in both New York and Delaware contract law.
As to the second question posed in this section pertaining to how
the difference in comfort level between New York and Delaware law
affect this article's theory, the theory is supported. The higher comfort level with Delaware law than New York law negates the strategic
formalism theory. If lawyers were bent on adopting one governing
law due to its superior formalistic quality, then it is unlikely that the
lawyer would express relative comfort with the contract law of both
Delaware and New York. H owever, the fact that lawyers tend to be
comparably comfortable with both laws also negates the reflexive copying theory. If lawyers are copying provisions without any thought, it
is unlikely that they will be able to compare the law of New York and
78. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. See GLOVER

ET AL.,

supra note 67, at

§ 10.02(2](b].

79. Professor Nadelle Grossman pointed out that "around 90% of them are challenged in
court. The usual challenge is by a dissident shareholder-someone who usually acquires shares
after the deal has been announced and through a fiduciary duty suit against the target board,
seeks additional disclosure and/or seeks to have the acquirer up its offer." Email from Professor
Nadelle Grossman, Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School, to Juliet P. Kostritsky,
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, (Mar. 7, 2014, 11:05 EST)
(on file with author).
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Delaware and to give an answer to their comfort level with both jurisdictions. In certain instances, lawyers may push for a particular state's
law (New York or Delaware) depending on how the state law resolves: (1) the survival of the statute of limitations and (2) sandbagging80 and whether the lawyer is representing a buyer or seller. The
speed of resolution could also influence a choice for Delaware law,
particularly in a period of financial instability. 81 Accordingly, this Article's theory of moderate thought is supported by these results. Some
thought is put into this decision, largely dictated by the context of the
agreement and its unique circumstances.
B.

Do Lawyers Report the They Care about Formalism?

The survey seeks to resolve one of the most persistent debates in
the contract literature: whether there are perceived differences between how strictly New York and Delaware interpret contracts.
Question 4 in the survey asked the respondents to "[p ]lease compare
the substantive contract law of New York and Delaware and pick
what you feel is the appropriate answer to describe the relationship in
terms of a strict approach to contract interpretation." The study
posed this question because the recent economic literature portrays
the flight to New York as a preference for the stricter formalism of
New York's contract law. 82
The survey results do not demonstrate an overwhelming perception
that New York law is stricter or more formal than Delaware lawunlike the overwhelming disparity of the results showing the lawyer,
not the client, makes the choice of law. Fifty.percent of respondents
answered that they thought New York and Delaware shared an
equally strict approach to contract interpretation. Approximately
14.13% answered that Delaware had a more strict approach, while
35.87% answered that New York was stricter. Clearly, a greater number of respondents view New York as more strict but half regard New
80. Sometimes a buyer acquires information that might allow it to sue the seller for a breach
of representation. However, if the information is acquired before the parties close, a question
arises as to whether the buyer can sue for damages for breach of a representation in view of the
pre-closing knowledge, because pre-closing knowledge could indicate that the buyer did not rely
on the representation. In Delaware, a buyer can sue despite such knowledge unless there is an
anti-sandbagging clause in the contract. New York only allows recovery if the source. of the
knowledge emanates from a third party, not the seller. See, e.g. , Brendan J. McCarthy, Sandbagging in M&A Deals: Is Silence Golden for Buyers?, STOUT Risrns Ross (2012), available at http://
www.srr.com/article/sandbagging-ma-deals-silence-golden-buyers.
81. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 7, at 111.
82 . See Robert E . Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1641, 1654 n.55 (2003) (study of indefinite agreements found New York to be more
formal).
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York and Delaware as equally strict. The balanced answer to the
question helps to explain why lawyers may not be strategically choosing New York law as a means of ensuring formalism-lawyers may not
think New York is more formalistic.
The interesting data surrounding this question is actually the number of respondents who did not answer the question. With ten respondents not answering, this question led to fewer answers generated
than almost any other question.. Several possible explanations may
underlie the high non-response rate. The question may not resonate
with practitioners or it may be a grey area for which the lawyers do
not know the answer. The lack of responses may also indicate that
what lawyers are most concerned about is predictability based on a
developed body of case law that addresses particular issues that are
likely to arise, not formalism or strict interpretation. 83 The lack of
responses may show that lawyers are not even thinking in these terms
of strict contract interpretation that are often employed by academics.
Therefore, despite its resonation in the academic community, the importance of formalistic contract interpretation may not mean that
much to practitioners who may not have the training in the nuances of
the contract law of their jurisdictions.
While Question 4 sheds light on lawyers' desire for formalism, by
asking about their perceived differences in strictness between New
York and Delaware, Questions 10 and 12 explicitly ask lawyers what
their reasons are choosing for New York and Delaware law, respectively. These responses support the Article's hypothesis that lawyers
put a moderate level of thought into choice of law provisions in
merger agreements. Lawyers care about the jurisdiction having a "rational jurisprudence." 84 That would seem to suggest that lawyers
would accept a state's governing law if it were rational and not aberrant or irrational. Lawyers also report the volume of case law being a
significant factor. This suggests an unwillingness to face the lack of
precedent. Although these preferences negate unthinking copying,
the preferences do not clearly indicate a strategic preference for formalism either. Even the one-third who ranked the substantive law of
contract interpretation in New York as the top factor does not necessarily mean that they were choosing formalism. Without an understanding of why a jurisdiction is chosen, 85 the identification of a
83. Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 62. The issue of strict interpretation or formalistic
interpretation "just did not come up." Id . There may be connections between predictability and
formalism that could be fleshed out in a future survey.
84. See infra Appendix Question 12.
85. Deciphering who is behind the choice of law is complex. See supra Part III.A.
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preference, for even a flight to New York, could not by itself demonstrate a preference for formal contract law, 86 even if one knew exactly
what it meant to characterize the entire law of a jurisdiction as evidencing formalism. 87 Many reasons might underlie the choice for
New York law and if those reasons do not demonstrate a preference
for formalism as the motive for the choice of law, the hard data on the
flight to New York would not support the new formalist claim. 88
C.

Lawyers Report No Trend to New York A way from Delaware

Questions 5 through 8 asked participants to opine on whether they
felt there was a shift in choice of law in merger agreements from New
York to Delaware or from Delaware to New York, and if so, how
significant that shift has been. The survey does not support a shift
from Delaware to New York; actually, it may demonstrate the opposite. This is consistent with my 2013 statistical study and with the 2012
study of Cain and Davidoff finding a flow toward Delaware after the
financial recession.89
Of reporting respondents, 65.05% indicated they had not noticed a
shift from New York to Delaware for choice of law provisions in
merger agreements.90 Of the 34.95% of respondents that felt there
was a shift from New York to Delaware, 41.67% felt that this shift was
significant and 13.89% felt it was very significant.91 Although more
practitioners may feel there is not a shift away from New York to Delaware for choice of law provisions in merger agreements, those practi86. Even if there was a flight to New York, if New York and Delaware are equally formalistic,
then some other factor would be motivating the move to New York as the choice of law for the
merger agreement.
87. Even if one could settle on or accept New York as being formal in some respects, such as
adopting a hard version of the parol evidence rule, it could be contextualist in other ways. It is
unlikely that a jurisdiction is ever entirely formalist or the opposite. See, e.g. , Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917). Finally, even if the law of New York might be
formalist on all fronts, the law of New York could have been chosen for reasons having nothing
to do with its "formal" character. Moreover, the rejection of California law may be attributable
not to anti-formalism but to a desire to avoid unpredictable results by California courts.
88. Assessing the driving force behind a choice is one difficulty with empirical data. Even if
the choice is made with volition and not randomly, what could one tell about the driver of the
choice even if one could show a change in the disparity in the choice of law in a time series? It
might show us that parties were influenced by a herd instinct to adopt the prior provision or
perhaps that parties have been influenced by a buck-the-trend motivation, resulting in a change
in the choice of Jaw frequency. We need more direct data on the motivation behind the choice of
law to move from the data to the underlying driver of the object of cho;ce.
89. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 7, at 95 .
90. See infra Appendix Question 5.
91. See infra Appendix Question 6.
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tioners who do believe there has been a shift feel it is a relatively
significant one.
Conversely, 92.23% of respondents said that they did not feel there
was a shift in choice of law from Delaware to New York.92 Only eight
respondents felt that there was a shift from Delaware to New York,
but of those eight respondents, six felt that the shift was only slightly
significant. E ven the few who do feel that there is a shift felt it was
only marginally significant. 93 This strong response that there is not a
shift in choice of law from Delaware to New York may be further
evidence of the predictability that practitioners desire in making
choice of law determinations. Delaware courts and judges are viewed
as more experienced, and the high volume of case law allows lawyer to
better determine possible outcomes if problems should arise that
could lead to litigation.
Because this new statistical study replicates the database of the earlier study of Eisenberg and Miller and covers acquisitions of private
targets, this study directly nullifies the earlier finding of a trend away
from Delaware and toward New York. Still unresolved, however, are
the reasons behind the choices that are being made, aside from any
demonstration of a trend.
D.

Many Justifications for Choosing New York or Delaware Law:
A Complex Picture

I started out with the hypothesis that would tie the choice of law to
attorney locale. I surmised that the shift to New York law, if any,
could be explained by a lawyer's desire to have New York law govern
because of a branch office in New York. I hypothesized that the lawyers' primary goal would be to choose the law of a jurisdiction with
which they were most familiar and in which they were licensed, in
order to avoid malpractice claims. However, the survey showed that
whether the firm is licensed in the jurisdiction was not a significant
factor in the choice of law. Twenty-six out of forty-two respondents
ranked the firm having an office in New York in the bottom three
rankings for choosing New York law. 94 A possible explanation may
92. See infra Appendix Question 7.
93 . See infra Appendix Question 8.
94. Although many lawyers said the location of the firm did not matter, in some instances, the
location of the law firm in New York or the presence of a branch office in New York seems to be
the only factor to explain the choice of New York law. Consider the PNC/National City merger.
See PNC-National City, Merger Proposed , SEC (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/713676/000095012308016152/y72384b3e424b3.htm. There, National City
was a Delaware corporation headquartered in Ohio. PNC was a Pennsylvania corporation headquartered in Pennsylvania. Neither had any real nexus to New York. The choice of New York
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be that malpractice concerns are not high when there is such a low
probability of litigation ensuing.
A competing theory proposed by other empirical scholars is a substantive preference for New York law due to its formalism, including a
hard parol evidence rule. 95 The survey does not directly support this
theory. If respondents chose New York law, the substantive law of
contract interpretation ranked as the top reason for doing so. However, only about one-third of respondents gave that answer as the specific reason for their choice. The top reason for using Delaware law
was a sufficient volume of cases, 96 which had similar non-dominating
numbers.
Another competing theory was the unthinking copying theory, stating that lawyers simply copy language from a prior deal and give no
thought at all to the boilerplate provisions. However, the fact that 109
lawyers who worked on mergers agreements from a six-month period
in 2011 were willing to fill out a twenty-four-question survey addresslaw, however, may be explained when considering that the acquiring company lawyer, Wachtel!
Lipton, was a New York law firm. In addition, Jones Day and Sullivan & Cromwell had no
Delaware or Pennsylvania office, and since Sullivan & Cromwell is headquartered in New York
City and Jones Day has a New York branch office, choosing New York law seemed easy, especially since no opinion other than a tax opinion was required.
95. Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1061-62.
96. See infra Appendix Question 12.
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ing the choice of law question indicates that the lawyers had given
some thought to the matter, negating the unreflective copying of prior
deal language theory. 97
What I learned from looking at the actual data is that it is very hard
to reduce the choice of law to one factor and that many different reasons are given for a choice of law; there was not one overwhelming
reason for choosing New York nor Delaware. The top reason given
for choosing New York law was the substantive contract law. 98 However, still only twenty-one of sixty-four respondents said this is the
most important factor (32.8% ). One interviewed lawyer indicated
that if the choice of law would be New York but for an objectionable
substantive rule, the merger agreement would be drafted to contract
around the objectionable rule rather than switching to another governing law. 99 Another lawyer interviewed said "[n]othing in particular" about the substantive law of a particular jurisdiction influenced
the choice of law. Rather, the "client is comfortable with New York
law" from prior transactions and counter parties are usually okay with
New York law and perceive New York law to be fair, reasonable, and
customary.100
Another significant reason for choosing a jurisdiction is the volume
of case law. This was the top reason for choosing Delaware law, and
most respondents ranked it in the top three reasons for choosing New
York law. As one lawyer 101 explained the importance of volume of
case law, "you may have a target located in Nebraska and both parties
willing to use Nebraska law other than the concern that there may not
be enough actual business cases that have been decided under Nebraska case law. Random example, but I think certain states are concerning because of the lack of case law." 102
One reason for the importance of volume of case law is that it lowers interpretation risk. 103 As one lawyer said, "[t]he issues have all
97. See GULATI & Scorr, supra note 16, at 33-44.
98. One cautionary note is that the survey did not list "rational jurisprudence" as a possible
choice for the question asking the reasons underlying the choice of New York law. Had the
survey done so, the lawyers might have chosen rational jurisprudence rather than substantive
contract interpretation. The differences between these terms and formalism could possibly be
delineated in a further survey or in future lawyer interviews.
99. Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 62. " If otherwise choosing NY law and NY comes
out a particular way through on~ of its default rules, then draft around the NY default rule; it
would not be enough to shift the choice of law to Delaware." Id.
100. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 19.
101. Interview with Lawyer 10 (Mar. 25, 2013) (on file with author).
102. Id.
103. Email from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor Emeritus, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
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been litigated." 1 0 4 Further, another lawyer explained the value of consistency: "if parallel provisions are in several agreements, and want
consistent treatment, one might want to choose New York law where
there is a large volume of cases that have treated and analyzed such a
provision." 105 Since lawyers make the decision on choice of law, not
clients, this predictability is even more important. 106 The failure to
predict a case outcome would possibly leave the lawyer liable for malpractice, or at least subject the lawyer to criticism from the client for
not being prepared for a particular outcome.
Following volume of case law, the next top two factors for choosing
Delaware are expertise of judges and a rational jurisprudence. The
confidence in Delaware judges may cause lawyers to choose the law of
Delaware because they are confident that the judges will apply the law
more effectively. If they pick the law of New York, judges may be less
expert and less reliable, and thus, there may be a less reliable application of the governing rule. H owever, one lawyer indicated that New
York does a better job adhering to plain meaning than Delaware.1 0 7
In relation to rational jurisprudence, one lawyer said, "Delaware is
chosen due to well known and well respected jurisprudence in the
area of contract and M&A law." 108 Both of these reasons, like volume of case law, also correlate with the desire for predictability and a
familiar law that helps lawyers to avoid giving wrong legal advice.
One lawyer who compared Delaware M&A law to Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") law, which has the perceived characteristic of being uniform, confirmed the predictability of Delaware. 109
The data in Question 12 raises some unanswered questions. It is
not clear why substantive contract interpretation ranked more importantly for New York than Delaware. It could be that if one trusts the
expertise of judges less, as lawyers seem to do for New York, then the
substantive law of contract interpretation is more important as a possible constraint on court decisions. But as the degree of comfort in
the expertise of the judges increases, as it does in Delaware, the conSchool of Law (Mar. 27, 2013, 21:58 EST) (on file with author). Lowering interpretation risk
creates value. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Interpretative Risk and Contract Interpretation: A Suggested Approach for Maximizing Value , 2 ELON L. REv. 109 (2011).
104. Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 62.
105. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54.
106. Predictability is more important than substantive law. Interview with Lawyer 7, supra
note 47.
107. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15.
108. Interview with Lawyer 4, supra note 37.
109. Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 62.
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cern with the substantive contract law decreases because lawyers are
confident that the judges will reach rational outcomes.
Delaware may also be chosen as a fair compromise when there are
no law firms in Delaware. 110 An example involves United Airlines
acquisition of Continental Airlines. 111
T.Co.

A Co.
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In the Continental acquisition, there were two Delaware corporations, two global law firms in Texas (Vinson Elkins and Jones Day),
each with no Delaware office, and a New York law firm (Cravath)
acting for the acquirer. New York could have been the logical choice
since the New York law firm would have a preference for New York
and the Jones Day and Vinson Elkins law firms each had a New York
office. However, large law firms are comfortable with compromising
on Delaware as the choice of law when none of them is in Delaware,
as was the outcome here.
110. Lawyer 8 mentioned Delaware as "compromise." Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note
21.
111. See Dealbook, United and Continental Announce Merger, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2010),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/united-and-continental-announce-merger/.
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Other factors affecting the choice of law for Delaware that were
discovered in interviews include the view that, "Delaware is a good
default rule" for private sellers not involving public companies. 112
Another lawyer indicated that the established strong fiduciary duty
rules in Delaware influenced the choice of law for Delaware when a
distressed sale was involved. 113 Another said, "clients prefer Delaware."114 Although lawyers typically decide choice of law, not the
company, clients may have an influence in a subset of cases.
Many other reasons that influence choice of law were mentioned in
interviews. They include: whether the sale was one involving a distressed sale; 115 whether the lawyer was representing a buyer or
seller;116 whether the lawyer was representing a private company or a
public company; 117 whether the merger was a true merger involving
the acquisition of a public company by a public company in which the
public company was merged out of existence or a disposition in which
a parent survives; 118 the desire for a neutral forum with a sufficient
body of case law; 119 expertise of the judiciary;120 the location of the
company's executive offices; 121 a reluctance to split or bifurcate the
forum and the choice of law; whether the law of a particular jurisdiction would apply to part of the transaction due to the internal affairs
doctrine; 122 whether there was a developed set of rules on remedies; 123
the incorporation of the target or acquirer; and the sandbagging and
survival of the statute of limitations in New York and Delaware. One
lawyer cited the better quality of lawyers in New York for the choice
of New York law because of a potential need to hire lawyers in the
jurisdiction of the governing law if litigations ensues. 124 One lawyer
explained a New York choice of law in terms of a "desire for a neutral
forum with a developed body of commercial law." 125 The preferable
112. Interview with Lawyer 4, supra note 37.
113. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 20.
114. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54.
115. See GLOVER ET AL. , supra note 67, at § 2.18(1), for a discussion of the particular issues
arising when there are distressed companies.
116. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 20 (explaining the greater importance of established
fiduciary law in Delaware when shareholders not getting 100%).
117. Id. (explaining private companies want the forum and choice of law to be where they are
located and public companies want the choice to be New York or Delaware).
118. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15.
119. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54.
120. Id.
121. Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 101.
122. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15.
123. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54.
124. Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 47.
125. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54.
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travel and logistics of New York over Delaware were also cited as
reasons for a New York choice of law provision. 126 Finally, if the target is publicly held, then the target's state of incorporation is almost
always chosen. 127 In private company acquisitions, the buyer will usually have post-closing rights against target shareholders, so what law
governs and which courts will hear it has greater meaning. 128 Context
places a critical influence on choice of law, at least as it is reflected in
the lawyers' answers. A follow-up survey could incorporate some of
these reasons that were mentioned in interviews.
Another additional insight, though difficult to quantify, is that some
lawyers may not consider the choice of law important 129 or spend
much time on it. Instead, the choice of law provision is considered an
ad hoc decision that is not heavily negotiated ex ante. 130 Lawyer interviews suggested that either the choice of law is unimportant or is
not so important as to be a "deal-breaker" and therefore not one that
clients or lawyers would insist on. One lawyer thought that the entire
survey was strange as so little time is devoted to the issue of choice of
law. 131 These findings suggest that there may be a disjunction between academics and practitioners on the significance of the choice of
law issue. If this is the case, the reasoning behind the differences in
how many agreements used Delaware law versus New York law may
not be of great substance.
Or, perhaps the choice between Delaware and New York is not very
consequential because there are not that many substantive differences
126. Id. (indicating the counsel is more limited and travel logistics are less desirable in Delaware). See also interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 62.
127. Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 101. Contract law has little bearing on litigation in
public company target circumstances. The target is the one that has real legal problems at the
shareholder level, which is governed by its corporate law. The shareholders of the target will be
cashed out or converted into buyer stock, and there is never any indemnity or covenant issue
post merger, meaning a buyer's choice of law would be meaningless post merger. And since the
premerger litigation generally comes from and is governed by the target's corporate law, why
choose anything else?
128. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. With private companies, New York or Delaware
law will govern unless the entities are in the same jurisdiction. Interview with Lawyer 10, supra
note 101.
129. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. But see Eisenberg & Miller supra note 4, at 1979
(suggesting boiler plate quality of clauses "should not be taken as indicating that the clauses are
unimportant.").
130. Interviews with Lawyer 13, supra note 42; Interview with Lawyer 14 (Dec. 4, 2012); Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. But see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 1981 (suggesting
that "choice of law and choice of forum provisions appear to be negotiated vigorously in these
merger contracts.")
131. See Interview with Lawyer 14, supra note 129.
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between these states when it comes to business combination law. 132
Then, when fighting over New York versus Delaware law, there are
only two major differences between the two: the survival of the statute
of limitations and sandbagging. 133
A final thought to consider in comparing Delaware and New York
for choice of law is that seventy of 100 respondents selected a choice
of law provision other than Delaware or New York in a previous deal.
After New York and Delaware, the two most popular states used by
the respondents in merger agreements are California and Texas. This
reliance on California is interesting as California courts are often
viewed as unpredictable, and the survey otherwise indicates that practitioners strive for predictability in choice of law provisions. Choice of
law provisions outside of Delaware and New York may be the result
of the company's location or the nature of that company. As one lawyer explained, "[f]or private companies ... they want forum and law
choice to be where they are located. " 134 In contrast "for public companies, Delaware or New York is always used." 13 5
In conclusion, there are a multitude of reasons that lawyers choose
New York or Delaware law. There is no single overwhelming reason
to choose either. Based on all the possible reasons for a choice of law,
the unthinking copying theory is obviously not valid. The formalism
theory is also negated by how many alternative reasons lawyers have
for choosing New York law. The data suggests that there is a moderate level of thought put into the choice of law decision, and that the
decision is very contextual, as it can be driven by a large number of
reasons depending on the circumstances of the parties, the lawyers,
and the agreement.

v.

CORPORATE OPINIONS AND INFLUENCE OF INCREASED
LAWYER LIABILITY

The responses to Question 19, which asked whether a corporate
opinion was required in the transaction, demonstrate that 76% of respondents did not require corporate opinions on their transactions.
Yet, in Question 20, 89.04 % of respondents reported that the fact that
a corporate decision was not required did not diminish the importance
132. Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 21 (providing there are " [n]ot that many substantive
differences on business combination law among the states.").
133. These two major issues are used to decide choice of law depending on whether representing buyer or seller and how these issues affect the lawyer's client. Interview with Lawyer 1,
supra note 20.
134. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 20.
135. Id.
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of the choice of law provision. While 84 % of respondents to Question
22 answered that they would be willing to accept a choice of law provision for a jurisdiction in which neither the lawyer nor a member of
their firm were licensed, the results of Question 23 suggests that 67%
would engage local counsel. In Question 21, one lawyer commented
that his firm would only give corporate authority opinions in Delaware, while another said that their firm would not comment directly
on Delaware contract law, only the DGCL.
The fact that 67% of lawyers would engage local counsel if not licensed in a jurisdiction in which they had to render an opinion, coupled with the limits of the scope of an opinion that they would be
willing to give, suggest a disjunction between what lawyers would be
willing to accept in terms of choice of law and what may occur in actual practice. This concern about giving a corporate opinion in a jurisdiction where a lawyer or a member of their firm is not licensed may
also relate to concerns about engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law.13 6 A lawyer may have concerns about giving a corporate opinion
for a jurisdiction in which they are not authorized because it creates
an increased liability for the unauthorized practice of law and malpractice should their opinion be incorrect.
Where a parent company has continuing obligations (as would be
true in a private merger pictured infra), the acquirer may demand an
opinion because they are the survivor company. The acquirer wants
to be assured that continuing representations and warranties are enforceable against the parent as a matter of contract law and corporate
law. Thus, they can run both ways, because the acquirer may be making promises for post-closing payments if they have withheld or escrowed some of the purchase price for protection against breaches of
warranties and covenants, or paying for noncompetes by the selling
shareholders over the life of the noncompete provisions (which are
tax gimmicks). Also, there may be post-closing covenants by the acquirer, as in supply agreements to sell the seller products.
For some lawyers the need to give such an opinion may not raise
professional issues, but for others the need for a corporate opinion
may change the comfort level with a particular choice of law provision. A firm may need to be qualified to render a corporate opinion.

136. The concern with the unauthorized practice of law has generated scholarship. See, e.g.,
Stephen Gillers, Lessons from Multijurisdictional Practice Commission: The Art of Making
Change, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 685 (2002).
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you nor your firm was licensed if you were not allowed to retain local
counsel?" That question would help shed light on whether the need
to render an opinion in the absence of local counsel affects the choice
of law and in what ways.
Further research should segregate the answers given by lawyers
based on whether there was a true public-to-public merger or a private merger, 142 since the contractual issues differ significantly between
them, as true public company mergers raise few contractual issues relative to private mergers.
PUBLIC COMPANY MERGER
Ta rget Company s.ha reholders.

Target Company

No enforceableo!Jligations su rvivethe merger

PRIVATE COMPANY MERGER
Target Company s.ha reholders

Contract
Enforce.ab eobligations
survivethe merger

Merger A g1reement

Tar get Co mpany

ltm••••••••••.i

Ac:qu iri ngCompany

No enforceableoblilgationssu rviveth e merger

142. The SEC EDGAR database that I used for my data set covers private mergers. EDGAR
reports exist for some, but not most private mergers. EDGAR will cover a private merger when
there is a controlling shareholder of the target public company, if the acquiring public company
needs to have its own shareholders approve the merger and will cover a privately owned company that is raising capital in the public company to effectuate the merger, usually through issuing debt, but sometimes equity. The key is that the target, the parent or the acquirer, must be a
reporting company in EDGAR. A truly private company will not be filing with the SEC. Interview with David P. Porter, Visiting Professor, Case Western Reserve School of Law (Nov. 6,
2013) (on file with author).
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One lawyer said that he was only comfortable giving a Delaware opinion not a New York opinion.137
The effect of the presence or absence of a corporate opinion can be
seen in the following example involving Berkshire Hathaway's acquisition of Lubrizol Corporation.13 8
Target
Co

Acq. Co. ChoiceLaw T.Co.State T.Co.op.

Lubrizol Berkshire

Ohio

OH

No

Acq.Co.
State

TCoLaw

ACoL

DE

OH

Ca.

In the Lubrizol merger, the California law firm Munger Tolles &
Olson did not care about the choice of law because they were not
required to render an opinion. Because Lubrizol is Ohio centric,139
choice of law would have been Ohio law under all normal circumstances. Although the internal affairs doctrine of Delaware would
come up, the Ohio lawyers working on this deal (Jones Day, Ohio)
would have been comfortable and familiar with Delaware corporate
law.
On this question of willingness to accept a choice of law provision
for a jurisdiction where the lawyer is not licensed, one lawyer indicated that although he was not knowledgeable about contract law in
the jurisdiction chosen, they "do have New York lawyers that can advise if a particular issue arises during negotiations. " 140
Also, it should be noted that while Delaware is widely accepted as a
choice of law for many firms without a branch in the state, the survey
does not directly ask whether the lawyer would be willing to deliver a
legal opinion on Delaware contract law without local counsel. The
importance of local counsel when legal opinions are required can be
seen in the answers to Question 23 in which 67% said they would
engage local counsel if the choice of law were one which they were not
licensed. One lawyer interviewed said, "[n]ot unless lender required a
legal opinion. " 141
For a follow-up survey, I would ask the question again, excluding
Delaware, and say, "would you accept a choice of law in which neither
137. "My firm will not opine directly on Delaware contract law although it will opine on
DGCL." Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15.
138. News Release: Berkshire Hathaway to Acquire Lubrizol for $135 per Share in an All-Cash
Transaction, SEC (Mar. 14, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/
000095012311026351/142195exv99wl.htm.
139. Id.
140. Lawyer 2, who works for Cleveland firm with a New York office, said, "[y]es, if the client
desired or if the other side insisted." Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 19.
141. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Empirical data can sometimes be used to support theoretical or normative arguments. This was true when the new formalists relied on an
empirical study finding a flight to New York to argue that such a flight
demonstrated the preference of commercial firms for formal contract
law. Another theory is that lawyers unreflectively copy choice of law
provisions from prior agreements. This survey of lawyers from 343
merger agreements seeks to resolve whether either of these theories
can be validated in a set of 2011 merger agreements. This Article and
the survey cast doubt on the claims for several reasons. First, the data
shows that lawyers, not clients, make the choice of law. The choice of
law does not represent, and cannot be used to argue that it represents,
an unequivocal commercial firm choice. Second, the reasons for the
choice of law are so variegated that they cannot support the argument
that formalism is driving the choice. Third, lawyers do devote some
attention to the matter, negating the notion that lawyers would copy
language from prior deals without any thought. Finally, the data
shows how important the particular context is and that without an understanding of all the variables, it is hard to decipher the meaning of
the choice of law.
Further research needs to be done segregating the choice of law
results in private and public mergers to see whether the results on
choice of law differ. In the true public merger case, there will be so
few contractual issues that the choice of the law governing the contract would have reduced importance when compared to the private
merger where contractual issues exist post closing.
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VII.

APPENDIX

Ple ase se lect a ph rase d esc r ib ing t he Imp act of the c hoi ce of fo r um on th e cho ic e of law:

100
90

80

70
60
50

30

20
lO

0'--....~~~~......~--J....~~~~...:.~--'.....
Significant impact

Moderate impact

Ba r

Answer

No impact

Slight Impact

Re spo nse

S1gmf 1can1 impact

tvlod rat e 1mpact

SHght mipact

No impact

-

%

34

3301%

51

49

13

12.62%

•

4 .85~'o

Total

103

Min

Max

Average

Value

Valuo

Yalu a

1 89

51 ~ o

100.00'·'

Vari ance

Sta nd a rd

Total

Total

Devla llo 1l

Res p o nses

Respondents

0 .65

0 .80

103

103
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Please se lect a phrase to describe how comfort able you , or a membe r of your firm, are with Delaware cont ract
law:

100
90

80

70
60

50
40
30

20
10
0

Very comfortable

--

Very comfortable

Co mfort able

3

Very uncomfortable

Re s pons e

Bar

Answer

i

Probably com.fortable

Comfortable

Probably comfortable

Very unco mfo rtable

'lo

66

62.8 %

26

24 .76%

12

11 .4 3Q/o

0.9r. %

105

To tal

Min

Max

Avera g e

Value

Va lue

Value

1.50

Tot a l

10000%

Varia nce

St a nd ard
Deviatio n

Re s ponse s

Tot a l
Respond e nt &

0 .54

0 74

105

105
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Please select a phrase to describe how comfortable you , or a member of your firm, are with New York contract

law:

100
90

so
70

60

Very comfortable

Answer

·1

Probably comfortable

Comfortable

-

Response

Bar

Very co mfo rtable

-

Comf ortable

Probably comf o rt abl

Very uncomfortable

"/,

57

54 .29 ° ~

30

2857 °',

15

14 29n'o

I

Vory uncomfortable

2 .86%

105

Tot al

10000%

Min

Mu

Average

Value

St andard
Deviat ion

Total

Value

Variance

Tota l

Value

Responses

Responde nts

1.66

0.69

0.83

105

105
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Please compare the substantive contract law of Delaware and New Yo rk an d pick what you feel is the
approp r iate answer to describe their relationship .

100
90
80

70
60

50

40
30

20

Re s ponse

Bar

Answer
OP.hvr•re 'Jnr1 New Ynrl< sh::tre an
. Ill '* 'rt ' !Ir ·M
I ~ontr 1ct

46

5 .00%

NPw Y<'1r1<. !aw L.:; much morH <1 trir t in
- +t t 1ri:; -l' ·· in ·,. Of!l...iware

33

35.87%

13

1413%

92

100 0%

0"lloware ti;'-4& <l mw·h mo1 f strict
.Jppr

1U1 IC

I lltf•

r~td l •On

~·

Min
Value

Mu
Vah1e

Average

Value

1.64

-

Variance

052

Standard

Deviation

072

Total
Re spon e

92

Tota l
R spondonts

92
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Have you not ice d any shift in the choice of law provision In merger agreements from a New York to a Delaware
choice of law?

100

90

80
70

60
50

40
30
20
10

0

No

Yes

Yes

Response

Bar

Answer

-----··

No

Total

Min

Max

Value

Value

67

Average
Value

Variance

Standard
Oevlstlon

Tot al
Resp nses

1.65

023

0.48

103

Total
Re•pondenta

I
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Please describe how significant t he shift has been.

20
18
16
14

12

10
8

6
4
2

0

Very significant

Significant

-

Answer
I

!Very significant
i

Significan t

Insignificant

Slightly significant

Ba•

Response

%

sl

13.89%

15

!

41 .67%

15

i

4167% j

;
:3

i Slightly slgnificanl
1

I

lnsignif 1cant

I

Total

l

2.78%

100 00%

6

Min

Mu

Va lue

Value

Total

Average
Value

Va rt a nee

Standard
Deviation

Total
Responses

Respond ante

2.33

0.57

07 6

36

36

l
'
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Have you noticed any shift In the choice of law provisions In merger agreements from a Delaware to a New York
choice of law?

200
180

160
140
120

100
80

60
40
20

0

No

Yes

#

Anawer

Response

Bar

:-

I

r

I Yes

12 i No

i

el

Total

Min
Value

%

7.77%

95

92.23%

103

100.00 %

Max
Value

Average
Value

Variance

Standard
Deviation

Total

Total

Reapon&es

Respondents

2

1.92

0.07

027

103

103

I
I
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6
Please Indicate how significant the shift has been.

10
9

8
7
6

5
4

3
2

0

Very significant

Answer

Response

-

Ve<y s19n1f 1cant

-

Shghtly s19nif1can t

To tal

Mm
Va lue

i'I'

Max
Valu e

12 !JQW

Ave rage
Value

Vari ance

Deviatio n

300

029

0 53

St a nd ard

To t al
Res ponses

Total
Respond ent s
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Ha s th ere been a merger agreeme nt where you have chosen New York law?

100
90

ao
70
60

50
40
30

20
10
0

No

Yes

Answer

Response

Ba•

%

Yes

66

63.46%

No

38

36.54 %

104

100.00%

Total

Min
Value

Ma x
Value

Average
Value

Variance

1.37

023

Oevlatlon

Total
Responses

Total
Respondents

048

104

104

Standard
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Please rank the following reasons for your choice of New York law In order from 1to6, with 1 being tne most
Important and 6 being the least Important .

25

l
I

20 1

~

01

5 '

..

15

10

I

02

•3
•5

J

The availabnity The existence of New York's Your firm having The negotiating The language Ir)
of a sufficient a business law substantlve law an office In New strength of the
a prior deal
volume of case
court
governing
York State
parties
law in the

contract

business law

interpretation

The availability of a sufficient volume of case law 1n the
, business law area

9

New York's substantive law governing contract

2

Your firm having an office in New York State

;

The language In a prior deal

1

G

si

2 '

Si

2

ai

I

S j 7 ! 11
9

i

4

'' 10

6

I

2.68

!I

4 .24

42
47

2.19

42 l

4.07

15

The
negotiating
strength of
the parties

1!

Tho
language
In a prior
deal

1;

5!

6

Max Value

47 ;

2

Your firm
having an
off ic e In
New York
Stato

1'

!

i
9

3\ 11 i 11 I
I
I
6,
9
'
10

New York's
substantive law
governing
contract
Interpreta t ion

The
existence
of a
busi nes s
low court

l

l

10 .]

The negotiating strength of lhe parties

Min Value

8

21 1

int erpretation

Tho avallabillty of a
sufficient volume of
case law In the
buslneas law area

! 14 ' 14 I
'
l

The existence of a business law court

Statistic

Average
Value

Response

Question

i1

••

I

Mean

2.68

4.24

2 .19

4 .07

3.02

Variance

1.74 I

1.94

1.72

2.46

231 I

3.32

i Standard

1.32

1.39

1.31

1.57

i .52

1.82 '

47

42

43 I

41

47

42

43

41

1

Deviat ion
Total

' Responses

! T otal
' Res po ndents

47

42

47

42

i

'

4 .32 :
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Has t here bee n a merger agreement whe re y ou have chosen Delaware law?

200

180

160
140
120

No

a..

Anawer

•;.

Respo nso

i' Yes

96.12% I

99

I

i
2

•

No

3.88%

i
103

To tal

Min
Value

Max
Value

100.00%

Ave rage
Value

Va ri ance

Stand ard

Total

Deviation

Responses

To tal
Resp ondent&

1.04

0 .04

0.19

103

103
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Please ra n k the follow in g reason s for your choice o f Delaware law In order from 1 to 6 , wit h 1 being t h e most
impor tant and 6 being t he least Impo r tant .

40
35

30
25

20

• 2

.,

15
10

•4

5

• 5
The e:idstence
The
The expertise Delaware's
of a rational availability of
of the
substantive
jurisprucleoce

a sufficient
volume ol
case law in

Delaware
judges

Your firm
having en
ofticein

Jaw ol
contract
interpretation

The
negotiating

Th&choice of
law provision

strenglh of Iha in a prior deal

Delaware

• 7

parties

Iha business

Question

The exi tence of a ratio nal Jllrispru dence

18

The ava ilabili ty of a SlJfficient vo lume o f case !aw in

the busme s area
The expert ise o f the Delaware judges
Delawares s ubs ta ntive law o f
Yo ur fir

having an o ff ice

10

26

18 24

20

29

ntract interpret atio n

9

17

16

6

13

37
8

Delaware

10

The nego!1at1ng strength of the parl1es

29

Stat istic

The
availability of
B sufficient
vo lume of
case law in
t ho bus iness

14

11

The cho ice of law provision 1n a prio r deal

Tho
existence of
a ra ti onal
j urisprud enc e

32

The

expen ise
of the
Oelawarn
jud g es

Delaware's
substantl\le
law of
contract
Interpre t at ion

10

Your firm
having
an office

in
Delaware

Response

Ave rage
Va l ue

70

280

76

22

74

224

73

34 8

53

.21

64

4 45

65

565

The
negot i ating
strengt h of
the parties

The
cho1co
of law
provisi on
In a prior
deal

4 45

5.65

Min Va lue

Max Value
Mean

6

2.8

'

1 '

5

22

22 4 .

348

6.21

Vari;:mce

2.39

112

123

1 23

14

295

126 '

tandard
Oev1at1on

1 55

1 06

1 11

111

118

1 72

1 12

Tot al
Respcnses

70

76

74

73

53

64

65

To ta l
Respondents

70

76

74

73

53

64

65
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Have you cho se n a j urisdiction f or the choice of law provisio n ot her than De laware o r New York ?

100
90

80
70
60

5o

II
40

1)!

30

20
10
0

Yes

Answer

No

Ba r

Re s ponse

Yes

73

7087 %

No

30

2913%

103

100.00%

Total

Min
Value

M3K

Value

Average
Val ue

Variance

129

021

Stand ard

Tota l •

Dev atlon

T otal
Responses

Respo nde nts

0.46

103

103
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What jurisdict ion other than New York or Delaward did you choose?

Agreements British Ca Calif

ca Iif0 rnia

Carolina Choice

Colorado Columbia Connecticut Contracting Delaware Domicile Draft English Fl Florida Frequently
Ga Georgia Home Idaho Illinois Indiana Israel Jurisdiction Kentucky Law Located M&a Maryland
Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Netherlands Nevada North Ny Occasionally Ohio Oil Ontario
Oregon Organized Pa Parties Pennslyvania Pennsylvania Quebec Rarely South Target

Texas

Transactions Tx Wisconsin

T ext Entrv

TX
California/Nevada
I

idaho

! California
Califo rnia

' COLORADO

I Domicile of Contract ing Part y
I

Texas
Texas for oil and gas transactions where parties are located 1n Texas
Ulinois

View More

Statistic

Re pendents

Value

67
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Please rank the reasons for your choice of non-Delaware or non -New York law, with 1 being the most important
reason, 6 be ing the least important .

•1

.,
• 3

•4

•S
The existence of The availability The expertise of
a rational
jurisprudence

Delaware's

The negotiating

The choice of

of a sufficient the jurisdiction's substantive law strength of the law provision in
volume of case
judges
of contract
parties
a prior deal
law in the
interpretation

business area

Questio n

1

Response

The existence of a ra tiona l Jurisprudence

5

T he availability of a sufficient vo lume o f case law 1n t he
business area

8

15
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4
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3
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The choice of law provision in
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Statistic
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a rational
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sufficient 'i'Olume of
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Max Value

6

330
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4

35
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1.75
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su bs ta nt i ve
law of
contract
Inte rpretati o n

1'

Min Value

Value

40
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32

a prio r deal
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ne g otiating
st reng t h of
t he part ie s

1

c hoic e o f
law
pro vision
i n a p rio r
d ea l

1'
6

6

33
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4.4

4 .38

17 5

3.98

Variance

24 2

1.7 4
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1 68

3.33

Standard
Deviat ion

1.56

1.32

0 98

1 68

1.3

1.82

Total
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40

40
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44
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Respondents
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44

Mean
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If the acquiring or target company I• incorporated in Delaware bu t t he law o f anoth er j u ris d ictio n was chosen,
was t here a de s ire to avo id Delaware law?

100
90
80

Answer

Yes

No

-

Response

Bar

833%

Total

Min
Va luo

Max
Va lue

Ave ra g e

Va lue
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17

Percent client d riven:
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#
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'----
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18
Percent firm driven :
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Was a corporat e opi n ion re quired in you r t r an sact io n ?

100
90

80
70
60

50
40

30
20
10
0

No

Yes

Answer

Yes

No

-

Bar

Respons e

Total

Min
Va lue

24

2400%

76

7600%

100

Max
Va lue

100

Ave rage
Value

Va rfa n ce

Sta ndard
Dev at Io n

Tota l

Tota l

Responses

Res pon de nts

1.76

0.18

0.43

100

100

0~'0
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20
Did t he fact that a corporate decision was not required lessen the importance of the choice of law provision ?

100
90

80

70
60
50
40

:lO
20

10

0

No

Yes

Answer

#

Yes

No

-

Bar

Res po ns e '

Total

Mm
Va lue

Mu
Value

%

8

10.96%

65

89.04 %

73

100.0 %

Average
Value

Va riance

Stand ard
Deviation

To ta l
Re sponses

Tota l
Res po ndent s

1 89

0.10

0.31

73

73
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How did the fact that a corporate op i ni on was required Influence the choice of law?

Advice Authority Availability Case Chose Chosen Club Comfort Contract Corporate

Counsel

De1awa re

Established Event Familiar

Jurisdiction

LaW

Needed Opine

Lawyer

Dgcl Direc tl y Effect Enforceabil ity

Firm Focus General Give Grea ter Helped Impact
Licensed Litigation Local Marginally Member Michigan

Opinion Qualified Require Significant State Writen York

Text Entry
Firm needed to be qualified in juri sdiction , o ur firm o nly gives corporat e aut hority opin ions in Delaware.

We chose the law that does not require a lawyer who is a "member of the Delaware clu b" in the event of litigatio n
Marginally greater comf o rt with Delaware t:::ase law
My firm will not opine directly on Delaware contract law (enforceability), all ho ugh we will opine on the DGCL.
significant impact
No t at all
It did not
Only comfortable giving Delaware opinion not New York
Need to be licensed to give writt en opinion bu t not lo give genera l adv ice
It did not

View More

Statistic

Respo ndents

Value

20
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22
Would you have been willi ng to accept a choice of law provision f or a jurisdiction In which neither you , nor•
member of your firm, was/ls llcenaod ?

100
90

eo
70

60
50

40
30

20
10
0

No

Yes

ea,

Ans wer

I1

Yes

i; 2

No

-

Tot al

Min
Value

Response

Mu
Value

%

86 1

84 .31%

16

1569% .

102

To tal

i

10000%

Average
Value

Variance

Standard
Deviation

Respon ses

Total
Respondents

116

013

0.37

102

102

2015]
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23
Would you have sp ecif ied local counsel If the agree ment specifie d the law of a jurisdictio n In which neither
you, nor• member of your firm, practice s law?

100
90
80

10

Answer

#

Resp o nse

Bar

%

Yes

64

67 .37%

No

31

32 .63%

Total

95

100.00%

Min
Value

I

i

Max
V& lue

Average
Value

Variance

Standard
Deviation

Tota l
Responses

Total
Respondent a

1.33

0.22

047

95

95

I

I
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24

Comme nts :

Buyer Ca e Certainty Choice Choose Ch sen Close Con tituent Continues Corporahon Counsel Courts Cuts Day

De Iaw a re
Law
Ny

De I

Dictates Enhties Generally Hand Happened Judo 1ary Junsdichon

l ocal l ocated Makes

Practloe Prefer Primary Prioritizing Rankings Re sons Require

Selected Sh1ft1ng Target Tend Venue York 16 13 t516 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 3233 34 35 36

37 38 39404 1424344 454647 4849 50 515253 54 5556 57 58 59 606162 63 64 65 66 67 869 70 71

Te xt Ent ry
Choice o f venue may be ot her than Del or NY even if Del or NY law is selected beca use o ne or bo t h constituent
enlil!os 1e I cated 1n a jurisd1ct1on other than NY and Del
63
11

48
20

12

None
28

Vie w More

Val ue

S t at ist ic
Respondents

77

